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Abstract
Based on the fundamental theory of value effects of 
investment, this paper investigates the motives of 
inefficient investment of listed company in China. 
Regression results using 3155 Shanghai and Shenzhen 
listed company observations in 2003-2005 show that 
investment is sensitive to cash flows when we control 
the growth opportunity, suggesting that some degree 
of inefficient investment of listed companies exists. 
Moreover these relationships are much stronger for 
state-owned listed companies. The motive test show that 
investment is positively correlated to future operational 
performance significantly for both state-owned and non-
state-owned listed companies, which means the reason 
why listed companies engaged in inefficient investments 
lies in agent conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
therefore the main form of inefficient investment of listed 
companies is overinvestment.
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INTRODUCTION
Under assumptions of perfect information and no 
transaction costs, Modigliani and Miller (1958) confirmed 
that corporate investment decisions has nothing to 
do with the financing decision, the enterprise value 
only depends on the future profitability, capital costs 
of investment projects, and achieves maximum at the 
optimal investment. However, perfect capital market 
assumptions does not exist in the reality, asymmetric 
information and transaction costs in the capital markets 
will lead to credit rationing, which causes the external 
financing required to bear the additional cost premium, 
making the enterprise face financial constraints and show 
obvious internal financing preference resulting in internal 
cash flow as an important determinant of investment. 
When companies have good investment opportunities 
without enough internal financing, given the higher cost 
of external financing, or capital rationing phenomenon, 
financing constraints would force companies to give 
up some investment projects with positive NPV. This 
result means that the investment expenditure of financing 
constrained companies should be sensitive to its net worth. 
By examining sensitivity between enterprise investment 
expenditure and cash flow, we can determine the issues 
of financing constraints of investment decisions. Because 
different companies subject to the financing constraints 
are quite different, and its sensitivity to internal cash flows 
should also be different. Typically, the higher financing 
constraints, the greater effect of internal cash flow on 
corporate investment is. Based on the theory above, using 
421 U.S. manufacturing panel data of listed companies 
in 1970-1982, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) first 
studied the relationship between corporate investment 
and the availability of internal funds. After controlling 
for investment opportunities, the results showed that the 
company’s investment expenditure is very sensitive to its 
internal cash flow and more significant for high financing 
constraint companies, which support the financing 
constraints hypothesis. Then, based on the pioneering 
research of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, using different 
classification criteria from a different perspective, many 
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scholars studied the relationship between financing 
constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
obtained study conclusions similar to Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein, 1991; Oliner 
& Rudebusch, 1992; Gilchrest & Himmelberg, 1995).
However, the drawbacks of financing constraints 
hypothesis under asymmetric information theory don’t 
consider the private interests of management or other 
agent, that is, an important prerequisite for the financial 
constraints are that the interests of company managers 
should be consistent with that existing shareholders, that 
is, manager act in the interests of existing shareholders 
(Myersand Majluf, 1984), which is obviously a strong 
assumption. As we all know, the modern company’s 
separation of ownership and management makes the 
composition of a principal-agent relations between 
shareholders and managers. Absent of appropriate 
incentives and constraints, to obtain the monetary and non-
monetary benefits associated with larger company scale, 
the managers will make investment decisions departing 
from the enterprise value maximum (Jensen, 1986). Since 
managers will be more monitored and disciplined from 
external capital market, managers prefer to use internal 
funds in inefficient investment, which also makes the 
company’s investment expenditure significantly positively 
correlated with its internally generated cash flow. This test 
results are very similar to financial constraints hypothesis, 
but this time investment-cash flow sensitivity reflects the 
overinvestment, rather than underinvestment. So, in an 
imperfect capital market, although the forming reasons of 
underinvestment and overinvestment are different, but as 
an inefficient investment, both investment and expenditure 
will increase with the company’s internal generated cash 
flow, making the investment very sensitive to internal cash 
flow. Thus, while the finance constraint model represented 
by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen is a very attractive 
intuitively, and relevant empirical research has also made 
great progress, some scholars challenged their universality 
of the conclusions. Using qualitative and quantitative 
information related to enterprise financial constraints 
as classification standards, Kaplan and Zinglas (1997) 
further divided the sample of the most serious financial 
constraints companies of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) into three sub-samples and retested their results, 
but obtained the conclusion completely contrary to that 
of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen: it is the lower financial 
contraints companies that exhibit higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivity, and concluded that higher investment-
Cash flow sensitivity cannot be used as evidence of 
financial contraints. Clear (1999), using 1317 U.S. public 
company in 1987-1994, and a multivariate discriminant 
analysis index as the classification standard of financial 
constraints, studied investment-cash flow sensitivity, its 
conclusions were more consistent with that of Kaplan 
and Zinglas. The reasons of such results can be explained 
by the free cash flow agent costs hypothesis, and 
financial constraint is not the only reason for explaining 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Pawlina and Renneboog 
(2005) investigated investment-cash flow sensitivity 
of the UK listed companies. The results show that the 
relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity 
and the management stakes was S-type curve; the major 
shareholders can reduce investment-cash flow sensitivity 
through effective supervision. Vogt (1994) confirmed that 
there were obvious under-investment for firms with small-
scale, high-growth opportunities, low dividend payout 
ratio, and overinvestment obviously existed for firms 
with large-scale, low-growth opportunities, low dividend 
payout.
In China, some scholars have showed that investment-
cash flow sensitivity also existed in China’s listed 
companies, but the theoretical causes and manifestations 
are controversial. Feng Wei (1999), Zheng Jiangzhun, 
He Xuqiang and Wang Hua (2001), Wei Feng, and 
Liu Xing(2004), argued that the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is mainly caused by the financial contraints, 
which showed that company was underinvesting. He 
Jin’geng, and Ding Jiahua (2001), Zhang Yi, and Li 
Chen (2005) found that investment-cash flow sensitivity 
in Chinese listed companies was primarily caused by 
agency problems, and overinvestment was their main 
manifestations. Lian Yujun and Cheng Jian (2007) argued 
that investment-cash flow sensitivity of listed companies 
in China was the common result made by financial 
constraints and agency problems. Low financial constraint 
companies tended to overinvest; high financial constraint 
company took on underinvestment.
There is a methodological error in the researches 
above. The usual practice is, according to some a 
priori criteria (dividend payout ratio, firm size, group 
members, ownership concentration, etc.), to divide 
the sample companies into financial constraints group 
and non-financing constraint group. If investment-cash 
flow sensitivity for financial constraint companies was 
significantly higher than that of nonfinancial constraint 
companies, it shows that the companies are facing 
financial constraints, and regards investment-cash flow 
sensitivity as evidence of the company underinvestment. 
On the contrary, if investment-cash flow sensitivity for 
nonfinancial constraint companies was significantly higher 
than that of financial constraint companies, it shows that 
there is a free cash flow agency problem within company, 
and then investment-cash flow sensitivity reflects 
overinvestment. Obviously, this is an indirectly method 
studying causes and manifestations of firm inefficient 
investment. Because that different companies suffer 
financial constraints or agent conflict is only relative, 
and will vary over time, therefore, that the companies 
are divided into the financial constraint group and non-
financial constraint group according to priori criteria is 
too simplistic and absolute, and it is difficult to draw a 
convincing and consistent conclusions, and endogenous 
Study on the Motives of Inefficient Investment of Listed Companies
52 53 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
CAI Jifu(2011). 
International Business and Management, 3(1), 51-57
problems for some priori criteria still exist (dividend 
payout ratio, firm size). This is the underlying reason 
why researches on corporate inefficiency investment are 
though very rich, yet don’t attain unanimous conclusions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate relevant elements 
of corporate inefficiency investment into an organic 
whole, and introduce new ideas and methods to study on 
causes and forms of the enterprise inefficient investment 
deeply.
There are two purposes for this paper: (1) whether 
corporate investment is lack of efficiency? (2) If exists, 
what is its motives and forms for corporate inefficiency 
investment? The analysis above shows that both 
financial constraints and agency conflicts will lead to 
corporate investment distortion, lack of efficiency, but 
the consequences are completely different. Financial 
constraints may cause the company underinvestment, 
and agency conflicts cause the company overinvestment. 
As different theoretical perspectives on how to eliminate 
inefficient investment have different policy conclusions, 
therefore, it is particularly important to find out its 
real cause of specific forms for corporate inefficient 
investments.
The research thoughts are as follows: First, we use 
investment-cash flow sensitivity to test if the inefficient 
investment exists in Chinese listed companies. After 
controlling the corporate investment opportunities, if 
the sensitivity coefficient of investment to cash flow 
is significantly positive, it indicates that enterprise 
investments in China have been distorted and inefficient. 
Then, based on the results above, we examine the reasons 
and forms for corporate inefficiency investment. Given 
that the company value usually achieve the maximum 
at the optimal scale of investment, underinvestment and 
overinvestment both indicate that the company’s actual 
investment expenditures deviate from the optimal level 
of investment, therefore, whether underinvestment or 
overinvestment will result in a suboptimal allocation 
of corporate capital, making capital and production 
factors idle or waste, and thus adversely affect the 
future profitability of enterprises investment. However, 
due to different attributes of underinvestment and 
overinvestment, from perspectives of the effect on the 
company’s future profitability, if there is underinvestment 
in corporate, an additional investment will boost the 
company’s future operating performance; to the contrary, 
if overinvestment, the additional investment will reduce 
the company’s future operating performance. Therefore, 
if the relationship between investment and the company’s 
future operating performance was monotonically positive, 
it indicates that there is underinvestment; financial 
constraints are the main cause of corporate inefficient 
investment. If the investment and the company’s future 
operating performance showed a monotonic negative 
relationship, it indicates that there is overinvestment; 
agency conflict is the incentive for its formation. If 
the investment and the company’s future operating 
performance was an inverted U-curve relationship, that 
additional investment in a certain range will help improve 
the company’s future operating performance, beyond 
a range, further additional investment will reduce the 
company’s future operating performance, in other words, 
the enterprise optimal scale of investment exist, then 
the corporate inefficient investment include not only 
the underinvestment, but also overinvestment, financial 
constraints and agents conflicts are both reason that lead 
to corporate investment lack of efficiency.
1.  DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
1.1  Sample Selection and Data Sources
This paper selects all A-share listed companies in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchange from 2003 
year to 2005 year as the initial sample. To ensure the 
validity of the data collected and minimize the effect of 
other factors on the data, we screened the initial sample 
based the following criteria: (1) Exclude the current 
IPO. Many researches show that the listed companies in 
China 3 years before and IPO year have obvious earnings 
management, which make financial data poor quality; 
(2) taking into account effect of extreme value on the 
negative impact on the result, we eliminate companies 
with absolute value of sales growth greater than 1 and 
omitted data; (3) financial listed companies are excluded 
because their investing, operating and financing activities 
may be not clearly demarcated. After screening based on 
the above criteria, the full sample consists of 3155 firm-
year observations. All firm’s financial statement data 
used in this paper are obtained from the WIND  financial 
research databases.
1.2  Model Selection and Variable Description 
1.2.1  The Test of Existence of Corporate Inefficient 
Investment
To compare the research with that of existing scholars 
results conventionally, we construct the following basic 
regression model to analyze the corporate investment 
efficiency:
                                                                                       
                                                                                         (1)
Where Iit  is the ratio of investment expenditure of 
company i in year t to beginning-of-year book assets, Git-1 
is growth opportunities of company i in year t-1, measured 
by the ratio of sale growth. CF  is firm’s net operating cash 
flow, scaled by beginning-of-year book assets. Theoretical 
and empirical evidences show that when the company 
investment occurs distortion and becomes inefficient, the 
company’s investment expenditure will be very sensitive 
to its internally generated cash flow. Therefore, if there 
is obvious inefficient investment in the listed company 
tititititi CFGI ,,21,10, +++++= −
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in China, we expect the regression coefficients of CF 
should be significantly positive. η i and γ t  are dummy 
variable reflecting corporate firm effect and time effect 
respectively, εit is error term.
1.2.2  Motivation Test of Corporate Inefficient 
Investment
In order to investigate corporate inefficient investment 
arising from financial constraints or agency conflicts, we 
specify the following regression models:
                                                                                         (2) tititititititititi DCFGIIEBITEBIT ,,6,5,4
2
,3,2,101, +++++++++=+
Where EBITi,t+1 and EBITi,t are the ratio of profit before 
interest and tax fot company i at year t +1 and year t 
to the beginning total assets respectively, proxying the 
company’s operating performance. Gi,t  and Di,t are the 
company’s growth opportunities and asset-liability ratio 
company i at year t respectively. According to analysis 
above, the test idea of model (2) can be summarized as 
follows: if α 2 is significantly positive, α 3 not significant, 
which indicate that the additional investment can 
improve the company’s future operating performance, the 
company underinvested, and financial constraints is the 
reasons leading to company investment inefficient; if α 2 
is significantly negative, α 3 not significant, that additional 
investment not only failed to improve the company’s 
future operating performance, but lead to decline in the 
company’s future operating performance, agency conflicts 
are main reason caused by inefficient investment; if α 2 
is significantly positive, α 3 significantly negative, that is, 
within a certain range, additional investment will help 
improve the company’s future operating performance, 
beyond a certain range, to further additional investment 
will reduce the company’s future operating performance, 
then the corporate inefficient investment include not only 
the underinvestment, but also overinvestment, financial 
constraints and agents conflicts are both reason that lead 
to corporate investment lack of efficiency. 
1.2.3  Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main 
variables used to estimate empirical equation (1) and 
(2). The mean (median) investment across all firm-years 
is equal to 0.07291 (0.04417) of prior year’s assets. 
These values are consistent with prior research. The 
mean (median) firm in the sample has a CF of 0.05421 
(0.05339), which is much greater than the median of 
investment expenditure, showing that internally generated 
cash flow of most companies can meet the needs of the 
theirs investment expenditure. The mean and median 
values are 0.15515 and 0.15925 respectively for current 
growth opportunity, which are lower than previous growth 
opportunity, taking on a clear downward trend. The 
mean (median) future one period corporate operational 
performance is 0.04369 (0.04536), which doesn’t improve 
significantly relative to the current corporate operational 
performance, indicating that the future one period 
corporate operational performance is still low and loss of 
some companies are even more serious than the current 
period corporate operational performance (the minimum 
value of  the future one period corporate operational 
performance is -1.3996, which is much smaller than that 
of the current period corporate operational performance).
Table 1     
Summary Statistics (n=3155)
Variables                         Means               Median                       Minimum                          Maximum                         Std. Dev
 
     I                               0.0729099                        0.0441748                     -0.2922736              1.483412                    0.0962415
 
   CF                              0.0542124             0.0533995                     -1.2651825              0.680583                    0.0971751
 
  Gt-1                              0.1753304             0.1646005                     -0.9958862              0.997071                    0.2914075
 
  Gt                                                       0.1551501             0.1592518                     -0.9999941              0.991110                    0.2998556
 
  EBITt                                            0.0389475             0.0450514                     -1.0957789              0.369265                    0.0978301
 
 EBITt+1                                          0.0436962             0.0453637                     -1.3996601              3.498912                    0.1196728
2.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
2.1 The Test of Existence of Listed Corporate 
Inefficient Investment: Analyzing Based on 
Investment – Cash Flows Sensitivity
Table 2 reports the multiple regression results of the model 
(1). Where the equation 1 is the all sample regression 
results, equations 2 and 3 are the multiple regression 
results that the sample are divided into state-owned 
controlling and non-state controlling listed companies 
respectively, to test the effect of controlling shareholder 
on the corporate investment efficiency. The coefficient 
of CF is significantly positive in equation 1, and keeping 
other factors unchanged, the company investment 
expenditure will increase in 0.250% for every 1% cash 
flow on average, which indicates that the company 
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investment is very sensitive to its internally generated 
cash flow, showing that there is some distortion and low 
efficiency for the listed company investment behavior. 
By comparing equations 2 and 3, we can find, although 
the coefficients of CF in the state-owned controlling and 
non-state controlling listed companies are all significantly 
positive, indicating that investment expenditure of 
controlling and non-state controlling listed companies 
are all inefficient. However, the sensitivity coefficient 
of investment to cash flow of state controlling listed 
companies is 0.262, significantly higher than that of non-
state controlling listed companies, which means that the 
degree of investment distortion of state controlling listed 
companies is more serious. According to the analysis 
above, the reasons resulting in enterprise investment lack 
of efficiency has two: the first is financial constraint, and 
second is agency conflicts, however, there are different 
inefficient investment results between the financial 
constraint and agency conflicts: the results of financial 
constraints is underinvestment, the result of agency 
conflicts is overinvestment. Related to this issue, what are 
the specific reasons resulting in state-owned controlling 
and non-state controlling listed company investment 
inefficient. This requires us to make motivation test. 
Coefficients of G  in all regression equations are 
significantly positive, indicating that the higher the 
company’s growth opportunities are, the greater their 
investment needs, which means that growth opportunities 
of listed companies in China is still an important driver of 
investment expenditure. 
Table2   
The Test Result of Existence of Listed Corporate Inefficient Investment
Equation                                       All sample                             State-owned company                             Non-state-owned company
Variable                                      Equation 1                                      Equation 2                                           Equation 3
                       Coefficient              t                        Coefficient             t                            Coefficient               t
Concept                          0.050        24.309***           0.047       19.624***                0.055       14.002***
   G                                   0.055          9.855***           0.056         8.541***                0.056         5.096***
  CF                                  0.250        14.781***           0.262       13.545***                0.202         6.322***
Observations                          3155                                                            2381                                                                 774
AdjR2                                               0.104                                                            0.107                                               0.097
  F                                                   183.891***                                          143.075***                                             42.750***
Note:depend variable is the ratio of investment expenditure; *** indicate the significance levels at 1%.
2.2 The Motivation Test of Inefficient Investment 
in Listed Companies: Analyzing Based on Value 
Effects of Investment
The multiple regression results of model (2) are reported 
in Table 3. Where the equation 4 is the all sample 
regression results, equations 5 and 6 are the multiple 
regression results that the sample are divided into state-
owned controlling and non-state controlling listed 
companies respectively, in order to test if there are 
the different reasons between state-owned controlling 
and non-state controlling listed companies’ inefficient 
investment. In equation 4, the coefficient of I  is 
significantly negative, and although the coefficient of 
I 2 is negative but not significant, the company future 
operating performance is significantly negatively 
correlated with investment, that is, the more companies 
invest, the lower its future profitability is. In accordance 
with the theoretical analysis above, the result means that 
the main form of listed company inefficient investment is 
overinvestment, therefore, it is the agency problem that 
leads to its generation. By comparing equations 5 and 6, 
the coefficient of I  and I 2 in the state-owned controlling 
and non-state controlling listed companies are all negative, 
although the latter is not significant, indicating that, for 
both state-owned controlling and non-state controlling 
listed companies, their investment expenditures are a 
misuse of funds. However, the higher coefficient (absolute 
value) of  I  for the state-owned controlling company 
indicate that, relative to non-state controlling listed 
companies, state-owned controlling company may have 
more serious overinvestment problem.
Table3   
The Test Result of Motivation of Listed Corporate Inefficient Investment
Equation                                       All sample                             State-owned company                             Non-state-owned company
Variable                                      Equation 4                                      Equation 5                                           Equation 6
                       Coefficient              t                        Coefficient             t                             Coefficient               t
Concept                         -0.037        -11.051***          -0.080       -9.159***                0.011        3.170***
 EBIT                               0.539         23.532***           0.558       11.041***                0.483      21.164***
To be continued
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Continued
Equation                                       All sample                             State-owned company                             Non-state-owned company
Variable                                      Equation 4                                      Equation 5                                           Equation 6
                       Coefficient              t                        Coefficient             t                             Coefficient               t
    I                                  -0.103          -3.296***          -0.297      -2.850***               -0.054       -2.137**
   I2                          -0.135          -1.317          -0.380      -1.212                                -0.066       -1.175  
  G                                     0.022            3.249***            0.023        1.329                                  0.024         4.205***
  CF                                   0.169            8.386***            0.222        3.810***                 0.125         7.317***  
  D                                     0.079          20.390***            0.054        0.871                                  0.110       15.540***
observations                                       3155                                           2381                                                                774
AdjR2                                                                                    0.288                                           0.332                                             0.310
  F                                                    255.832***                                        179.624***                                             76.720***
Note: depend variable is ratio of profit before interest and tax; **, *** indicate the significance levels at 1% respectively.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we use the basic principles of investment 
value effect to reexamine the reason and forms of listed 
company inefficient investment. After controlling the 
investment opportunities of companies, Regression results 
using 3155 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company 
observations in 2003-2005 show that investment is 
sensitive to cash flows when we control the growth 
opportunity, suggesting that some degree of inefficient 
investment of listed companies exists. Moreover these 
relationships are much stronger for state-owned listed 
companies. The motive test show that investment is 
positively correlated to future operational performance 
significantly for both state-owned and non-state-owned 
listed companies, which means the reason why listed 
companies engaged in inefficient investments lies in 
agent conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
therefore the main form of inefficient investment of listed 
companies is overinvestment.
In summary, although the problems of overinvestment 
in non-state-owned controlling companies are lower 
than that of state-owned controlling companies, but non-
state-owned controlling companies also take on not 
the characteristics of overinvestment similar to that of 
state-owned controlling companies. This result suggests 
that the inefficient problems of state-owned property 
rights and the resulting agency conflicts are not bound 
to be automatically eliminated with the state-owned 
enterprise property rights reform. Under the premise 
that bad institutional environments have not been 
fundamentally improved, the inherent design defect of 
state-owned property rights system does not mean the 
superiority of private property rights. The effectiveness of 
private property rights depends on the degree of market 
competition. So, completely contrary to the theoretical 
expectation that privatization of state-owned controlling 
company will ease the agency problem, in the institutional 
environment with the relative softening of constraints, 
the actual controller of any type companies with property 
rights have incentive to expropriate the interests of 
external investors by means of the company’s control. 
In other words, the agency problems of non-state-owned 
controlling companies are not necessarily lower than 
that of state-owned controlling companies. Therefore, to 
solve the over investment problem of listed companies 
in China, and eliminate the negative impact on investors, 
in addition to restricting the control rights over free cash 
flow of managers (or controlling shareholders), we should 
fundamentally change our country’s unreasonable market 
institutions and environments.
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